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are good and being good they should be extended to every possible sphere. If the
laws of the United States are being extended to these given spheres, there is no




P E R J U R Y-CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATIVE
POWERS-SPEEDY TRIAL-Major William V. Holohan was commanding
officer of the Mangostine mission of the Office of Strategic Service which para-
chuted behind German lines in Italy on September 26, 1944. The purpose of the
mission was to unify and assist various partisan groups behind the German lines.
Members included Major Holohan, Lieutenant Icardi, Sergeant LoDolce and Cap-
tain Landy Tozzini and Manini were two Italian partisans who later joined and
worked with the group. In December, 1944, Major Holohan disappeared. In
June, 1950 Tozzini and Manini were trapped in a series contradictions and con-
fessed, implicating themselves with Icardi and LoDolce in the murder of Major
Holohan.
The body of Major Holohan was recovered June 16, 1950, from Lake Orta,
Italy, exactly where Tozzini and Manini admitted in their confessions that they
had deposited it. In August, 1950, in Rochester, New York, LoDolce admitted
participation in the killing with Tozzini, Manini and Icardi. See inserted statement
in Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives under authority of H. Res. 125, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. at
103 (1953).
Pursuant to the Italian law the Novara Court of Assizes, in August, 1950,
indicted in absentia both Icardi and LoDolce. The Italian Government's request
for extradition of LoDolce was refused. In re LoDolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.
N.Y. 1952).
In March, 1953, Icardi, who had been honorably discharged in 1946, testified
voluntarily before the Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee regarding the disappearance of Major Holohan. On the testimony given
before this committee, Icardi was indicted in eight counts for the crime of
perjury. United States v. Icardi, Criminal No. 821-55, D. C., August 1955.
This case leads to an inquiry as to the legitimate function of the Special
Subcommittee. H. Res. 125, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. Until now only one objective
of a House or Senate investigation has been recognized by the Federal Courts as
being within their constitutional powers. The purpose of the investigation must
be to gather information for the enactment of legislation. McGrain v. Daugherty,
173 U. S. 135 (1927).
Neither House possesses the general power of inquiring into the private
affairs of citizens, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 190 (1880), nor can
they "compel divulgence of information for the purpose of ascertaining whether
a crime has been committed as a basis for a criminal prosecution." United States
v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 61 (1941). Yet the sub-committee in its own report,
Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services United States House
of Representatives H. Res. 125, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1953), admitted that it
was conducting its investigation for that very purpose, Report, supra, conclusions
page 1, i.e., to ascertain whether the defendant had knowledge of facts and circum-
stances surrounding the disappearance and death of Major Holohan. Apparently
this indictment, in form an indictment for perjury before a Congressional com-
mittee, is in practical effect an indictment for the crime of murder. In order
to secure a conviction of the perjury charge, the Government must prove that
the defendant is guilty of brutally killing his commanding officer.
Here it seems that the defendant could register a basic complaint, i.e., that
the legislative investigating committee is guilty of usurping the function of a
judicial agency and exercising a power not granted by the Constitution. This
case could possibly be a legislative trial in its starkest form--chief prosecution
witnesses were a newspaper man and a professional investigator-every word of
their evidence were utter hearsay. The summary is completely devoid of the
faintest suggestion of a legitimate legislative purpose.
The question whether Congressional committees can compel testimony to
inform the public about some issues in which Congress is not specifically
authorized to act, either because of a specific prohibition in the Constitution or
because the power to deal with that issue has not been delegated to the national
government and therefore remains with the states or the people, is still an
unanswered Constitutional problem. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra at 168,
Congressional power to inquire into "private affairs" was denied. But what is"private" can not be determined by abstract criteria; when Congress has juris-
diction to inquire into anything relevant to the inquiry, it is no longer private.
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, (1929). Assuming that a limitation
upon this power of Congress to inquire into these "private" matters is desirable,
the legislator can almost always spell out some relationship to some legislative
purpose, and the courts for understandable reasons are reluctant to interfere with
such inquiries. It must be remembered that the determination of relevancy in
ordinary litigation, where the issues are precisely delimited by the pleadings is
far simpler than in legislative inquiry where legislative objects may be manifold
and general.
An indication of the almost limitless bounds of relevancy is found in United
States v. Bryan, supra at 58, where Judge Holtzoff held:
"If the subject under scrutiny may have any possible relevancy and ma-
teriality, no matter how remote, to some possible legislation, it is within the
power of Congress to investigate the matter. Moreover the relevancy and the
materiality of the subject matters must be presumed. The burden is on the
one who maintains the contrary to establish his contention".
The events forming the basis of the indictment took place on December 6,
1944. The defendant was interrogated on the events in 1947, and testified before
the House Committee on March 26, 1953. At the time of the latter testimony
it had been determined that extradition of Icardi to Italy had been barred by the
Lo Dolce case. In re Lo Dolce, supra. It had also been determined that prosecution
by a United States Court for the alleged murder was made impossible by the
Hirshberg case. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, Commanding Officer,
336 U. S. 210, (1949).
The defendant was indicted for the perjury charges in August, 1955, approxi-
mately eleven years subsequent to the events of December 6, 1944, and two years
after the Committee hearing. The indictment for perjury was brought within the
statutory period, 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1948), as limitations to the charge of perjury
run from the date accused is alleged to have given the false testimony. Waddle v.
State, 165 S. W. 591 (1914).
The question arises as to whether the defendant has been given a constitutional
right-that of a right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of
the Constitution. The recent case United States v. Provoo 17 F.R.D. 183 (1955),
held "that the unnecessary delays in indicting the defendant and bringing him
to trial, denied the defendant the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the
Constitution." In United States v. Mc Williams, 69 F. Supp. 812 (D. D. C. 1946),
the court said:
"as in long delayed cases, the witnesses are now scattered; some are not
accessible, more particularly to the defendants who are without funds; the
memories of witnesses as to events occurring many years ago are not clear.
It is for these reasons among others that the Constitution of the United
States requires a speedy trial and that the Congress of the United States
has imposed statute of limitations to prevent long delayed prosecutions".
Today, there are cases in which perjury indictments have been used to
prosecute individuals who have allegedly lied about acts barred from prosecution
by the statute of limitations, United States vs. Hiss, 185 F. 2d 822 (2nd Cir. 1950)
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 948 (1951), or as in the present case by lack of jurisdiction
over the crime.
Legislative committees should be allowed wide access to facts, and an un-
limited amount of time in which to investigate these facts, where the purpose
of the investigation is valid legislation. However, where there seems to be no
valid goal, but investigation aimed at a particular individual, the legislative power
of investigation should be limited.
FRANK FLANNELLY
MARIO MELUCCI
COURTS-MARTIAL-UNLAWFUL EXCUSAL OF COURT MEMBERS BY STAFF
JUDGE ADVOCATE-IS EXCUSAL OF COURT MEMBERS BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT
A DELEGABLE DUTY?-A general court-martial sitting in Korea convicted appellant
of sodomy. Intermediate reviewing authorities approved the finding. Nothing in
the record indicated that the convening authority had delegated a power of
excusal to the staff judge advocate, so on appeal the United States Court of Military
Appeals ordered a rehearing on the ground that the unauthorized excusals by
the staff judge advocate interfered with Article 22, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 50 U. S. C. § 586 (1952), which requires that the convening authority
select and appoint personally the officers who are to sit on the court-martial.
United States v. Allen, 5 U. S. C. M. A. 626, 18 C. M. R. 250 (1955).
The narrow basis of the decision is the fact that no delegation to the staff
judge advocate appeared in the record. However, Judge Brosman, writing for the
court, opined that the power of excusal for good cause could be delegated to the
staff judge advocate, before arraignment. Perhaps the court will adopt this sugges-
tion when a case with an actual delegation on the record comes up for review. But
as indicated by the concurring and dissenting opinions, the other judges are not
wholly in agreement.
It is clear that after arraignment the power cannot be delegated. Article 29
U. C. M. J., 50 U. S. C. § 593 (1952), is Congress' first expression on the subject:
Article 29. Absent and additional members.
(a) No member of a general or special court-martial shall be absent or
excused after the accused has been arraigned except for physical disability or
as a result of a challenge or by order of the convening authority for good
cause. (Emphasis added)
This Article is further implemented by the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM)
(1951) which is issued by the President of the United States:
41 d. Effect of absence.-(4) After arraignment.-If a member who was
present at the arraignment of the accused is absent from a future session of
the court in the same case, the court may proceed only if a quorum remains
and the absence is the result of a challenge, or a physical disability, or the
order of the convening authority for good cause. . . . To determine whether a
member is absent by order of the convening authority, the court may accept
the statement of the trial counsel that he has been advised by oral order, signal
or despatch that the member has been excused by the convening authority from
future attendance in the case (37c). (Emphasis added)
The meaning of these sections is obvious: after arraignment, except for physical
disability (41c) or challenge (62f), the convening authority must excuse court
members personally. They do not control here, however, because the staff judge
advocate excused before arraignment.
Before arraignment, the code is silent; but the relevant provisions of the MCM,
[41 (c), (d)], have been construed insofar as they apply to trial counsel and
the president of the court. In United States v. Holt, 8 C. M. R. 360, review
denied 2 U. S. C. M. A. 688, 8 C. M. R. 178 (1952), the record did not
contain any explanation for the absence of court members. So the board of review
presumed that the convening authority had in fact excused them. And where
the record showed that the trial counsel, acting on his own, failed to notify the
members of the court to appear for court duty, a board of review said that, in
effect, the trial counsel had exercised additional challenges which would prejudice
the accused. United States v. Moses, 11 C. M. R. 281 (1953). Yet in United
States v. Marion, 14 C. M. R. 347 (1953), where the power of excusal was in
fact delegated to the president of the court, it was held that the delegation did
not prejudice the accused in any way. The board of review said, "... we know no
authority which places that function in the category of those duties of the convening
authority that are nondelegable."
These decisions by the boards of review leave unanswered the possibility of
delegating to a staff judge advocate the power of excusal for good cause. Here the
court did likewise by disposing of the case without actually deciding that issue.
As already mentioned, without referring to the Marion case, supra, Judge Brosman
took the position that the power can be so delegated for good cause, before
arraignment. (p. 639) And Judge Latimer agrees. He "... . finds no reason to
hold that this is a nondelegable power." (p. 645 ) Nor does he restrict it to good
cause, as does Judge Brosman. But their position seems to conflict with paragraphs
41 (c) and (d) MCM (1951), which require that the convening authority be
notified of all absences before arraignment.
41 c. Absence of members.- . . If, before the assembly of the court for the
trial of a case, it appears to a member that he should not sit on the court,
either at all or in a particular case, for reasons enumerated in 62f (Challenges
for cause-grounds for) or for any other reason except physical disability, he
will take appropriate steps to bring the matter to the attention of the conven-
ing authority.
d. Effect of absence-(3) Before arraignment.-The unauthorized ab-
sence of a member of a general or special court-martial from a session of the
court may be a military offense, but his absence prior to the arraignment of the
accused will not prevent the court from proceeding with the trial if a quorum
is present. However, the trial counsel will report any unauthorized absence
of a member to the convening authority. (Emphasis added)
Inasmuch as the requirement for the personal participation of the convening
authority is mandatory, it seems evident that the power to excuse before arraign-
ment is nondelegable. As Judge Quinn stated in his concurring opinion, the
power to excuse is "part and parcel" of the power to convene; consequently it
cannot be exercised by anyone other than the convening authority personally.
(p. 640) Judge Lattimer, dissenting, relies on a presumption of the regularity
of the proceedings-despite the holding in United States v. Andress, infra-and
declares that the staff judge advocate did not deny the accused any of his statutory
rights-thus he was not materially prejudiced. (p. 641) It should be noted, how-
ever, that in United States v. Andress, 11 C. M. R. 229 (1953), it was decided
that where the acts of the staff judge advocate alter the basic composition of the
court, the accused could be prejudiced. [And see Article 25 (d) (2) U. C. M. J.,
50 U. S. C. § 589 (1952), which requires that the convening authority select
members by evaluating their qualifications based on their age, experience, and
judicial temperament.] To presume regularity would attribute to the convening
authority an awareness that the staff judge advocate was acting in a manner
declared reprehensible by a board of review. United States v. Andress, supra.
It is apparent that the convening authorities in our Armed Forces appoint
oversize courts to avoid the continual attention which a smaller court requires.
Article 29 U. C. M. J., 50 U. S. C. § 593 (1952); see United States v. Moses, supra.
In order to reduce effectively the administrative burdens of the convening au-
thority, a complete break with the military tradition is necessary. The power of
convening courts-martial should be vested in an independent department of the
military (see the various departments recommended by the American Bar Associa-
tion, Report of the Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure to the 1956
Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, Resolution 6, p. 56), or the board
members can be selected by lot. See Keeffe, JAG Justice in Korea, P. 16, supra.
A moderate solution would be to allow a delegation of the power of excusal
for good cause to an impartial officer (staff judge advocate or president of the
board) by amending paragraphs 41 (b) and (c) MCM (1951). However, before
permitting a delegation, a maximum number of officers must be fixed. Otherwise
the practice of appointing large courts could not be curbed. See United States v.
Andress, supra.
A desirable maximum for a general court-martial would be seven to nine
officers; and for a special court-martial, from five to seven officers. (Paragraph 4(b)
MCM (1951) and Article 16, U. C. M. J, 50 U. S. C. § 576 (1952) should be
amended accordingly.) With so small a margin between the maximum and the
minimum, excessive absences will probably reduce, below a quorum of five, the
number of officers present when the court assembles. Still the basic composition
of the court would be intact because the convening authority has to make addi-
tional appointments personally. Article 29 (b) U. C. M. J., 50 U. S. C. § 593
(1952).
ROBERT 0. TIERNAN
